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FINANCING THE DOD ACQUISITION BUDGET:  





This project identifies a need for alternative financing options in the Department of 
Defense (DOD) to provide increased capability to the warfighter in today’s exigent 
military environment.  Further, this project compares the history of Public-Private 
Partnerships in the U.S. Government with the United Kingdom (UK) Ministry of Defense 
(MOD).  We intend to showcase the increased capabilities currently enjoyed by the UK 
MOD from entering into these agreements.  Additionally, it will provide an in depth look 
of three Private Finance Initiatives (PFI) that Serco Inc. has undertaken and future 
prospects for the private financing technique.  Finally, this analysis will evaluate the 
value for money gained by using Public-Private Partnerships through proper risk transfer 
in lieu of Full Up-Front Funding.     
 The examination concludes that continued and expanded use of Public-Private 
Partnerships provides increased real time capability to DOD while supporting private 
industry.  Public-Private Partnership agreements may not always be the most inexpensive 
means of procurement from a purely financial standpoint.  However, this relationship 
provides several tangible real time benefits to the government and seeks to reduce the full 
life cycle cost.  
First and foremost, private relationships reallocate risk and up front capital 
requirements allowing the government to spread program cost over time.   Freeing up the 
initial capital requirement affords the government the ability to acquire products and 
services with the limited resources provided in today’s austere budget environment.  
Finally, Public-Private Partnerships provide the government with an increased 
infrastructure and technological capability without having to allocate current year dollars 
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In the past year, the United States government has advised the nation’s military to 
expect budget reductions.  The military must look to different forms of financing in order 
to better utilize budget dollars and continue to acquire cutting edge technology.  The 
Department of Defense must find a way to attain greater value for the money spent in its 
mission of maintaining national security. 
This study examines the use of Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) in both the 
United Kingdom and Australia.  Both countries have developed an acceptance and 
appreciation of Public-Private Partnerships in order to find greater value for their 
constituents.  These governments use an economic tool called the Public Sector 
Comparator (PSC) in order to better compare the value gained in the transfer of risk and 
determine whether traditional procurement or PPP is the better solution. 
 Not utilizing the PSC in the United States is one reason, but there are multiple 
obstacles to overcome prior to the acceptance of PPP’s federally. The United States 
should take the following steps to accept PPP’s as a procurement option: 1. Form a 
committee to examine the use of PPP’s, 2. Commit to PPP’s as a viable option, and 3. 
Recognize  the complexity of PPP’s  and may require subject matter expert’s to be 
successful.   
If the United States government is serious about gaining more value for every 
dollar spent, the federal government should look at other defense markets and 





















 The standard method of procurement for government projects is full up-front 
funding by the U.S. Congress.  Historically congressional finance committees have 
determined that the most inexpensive method of purchasing additional warfighting 
requirements is by providing full authority up front.  However in today’s austere budget 
environment it is becoming increasingly difficult to allocate the funds necessary to 
procure 21st century warfighting capabilities.  Recently government agencies have been 
employing nonstandard financing techniques to mitigate current year funding shortfalls.  
In August 2003 the Government Accountability Office (GAO), Congress’ watchdog 
agency, was tasked to identify these techniques and provide supporting documentation to 
support their viability.  The GAO reported the following: 
“Agencies have been authorized to use an array of approaches to obtain 
capital assets without full, up-front budget authority.  Our work identified 10 
alternative financing approaches used by one or more of 13 agencies.  These 
approaches are: 
• Incremental funding  
• Operating Leases 
• Retained Fees 
• Real Property Swaps 
• Sale-leasebacks 
• Lease-leasebacks 
• Public-Private Partnerships 
• Outleases 
• Share-in-Savings Contracts 
• Debt Issuance 
GAO further stated in their report that meeting capital needs through 
alternative financing approaches can be very attractive because the agency 
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can obtain the capital asset without first having to secure sufficient 
appropriations to cover the full cost of the asset (GAO 1).” 
 
In recent years federal agencies who control vast real estate portfolios have had 
good luck with “outleases” and “share-in-savings contracts.”  Outleasing involves leasing 
underutilized properties to private industry.  Share-in-savings contracts, on the other hand 
is a method in which the government pays back the contractor over time utilizing the 
savings generated by the product.  However, DOD is generally more concerned with 
warfighting capability which does not normally equate to operating efficiencies.  
Therefore, of the options listed by the GAO, Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) or Private 
Finance Initiatives (PFI) seems to be the most promising for procurement of new 
capabilities.  A Public-Private Partnership is a situation where private industry is brought 
in to help finance, or finance and run new government procurement programs.  A Private 
Finance Initiative is a form of PPP where the private sector takes on the risk of financing 
the government project.  Private industry can provide a deluge of capital and management 
expertise that government agencies do not possess and could not purchase with limited 
near term budget authority.  The DOT found: 
Expanding the private sector role allows the public agencies to tap private 
sector technical, management and financial resources in new ways to 
achieve certain public agency objectives such as greater cost and schedule 
certainty, supplementing in-house staff, innovate technology applications, 
specialized expertise or access to private capital (DOT 1). 
 
As indicated above, Public-Private Partnerships can take many forms, but this 
paper will focus primarily on procurement arrangements vice service oriented contracts.  
Outsourcing services has become commonplace in today’s budget environment so as to 
avoid unnecessary personnel and overhead cost.  This same technique can be applied to 
the procurement of systems and products in order increase readiness while reducing 
timely development costs. 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Considerable research has been done in this field by government agencies such as 
the GAO, Department of Transportation (DOT) and Department of Energy (DOE).  
However, DOD has limited its approach to service oriented activities.  Our research 
focuses on the readiness benefits by forming PPP’s to help finance the growing military 
procurement programs.  The procurement problem will be addressed by answering the 
following questions: 
1) What makes PPP/ PFI financing attractive to military procurement programs? 
2) What obstacles are present in the United States to prevent entering into PPP or 
PFI agreements? 
3) Why are PPP’s more successful outside of DOD & Internationally? 
4) Does PPP/ PFI financing produce reduced lifecycle cost? 
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II.  ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS FOR FINANCING IN 
GOVERNMENT 
Government projects are traditionally “fully funded” and budgeted accordingly at 
inception.  This type of procurement style requires a large portion of capital to be tied up 
early in a project’s life cycle.  Large financial commitments to future development 
projects leave little room in today’s budgetary environment for the necessary and 
increasing cost of doing business.   
 
Such up-front funding provides recognition for commitments that are 
embodied in budgetary decisions and maintains government wide fiscal 
control.  However, providing budget authority for the large up-front costs 
of capital assets creates challenges in an area of resource constraints (GAO 
1). 
 
Today’s tight fiduciary environment will not adequately support undertaking new and 
necessary projects as the cost’s of new technology and infrastructure continue to climb.  
As these costs climb acquisition of new systems and capabilities, using the current “full 
funding” model, becomes unrealistic.  Several new approaches have been identified and 
implemented.  All of these options rely on private sector cooperation and business 
integration.  The concept of Public-Private sector integration is nothing new.  The Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) has identified the necessity and future reliance on 
this business model in their A-76 circular. 
Policy:  The longstanding policy of the federal government has been to 
rely on the private sector for needed commercial services (OMB 1).  
Of these alternative techniques, Public-Private Partnerships is the most prolific model 
used.  Therefore, this report will focus on Public-Private Partnerships and broadening 





A.  PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS   
 The national council for Public-Private Partnerships defines PPP’s as: 
A Public-Private Partnership is a contractual agreement between a public 
agency (federal, state or local) and a private sector entity.  Through this 
agreement, the skills and assets of each sector (public and private) are 
shared in delivering a service or facility for the use of the general public.  
In addition to the sharing of resources, each party shares in the risks and 
rewards potential in the delivery of the service and/or facility (National 
Council for PPP’s, Defined). 
 
A Public-Private Partnership is simply a sharing of resources and profit potential 
for a publicly desired or needed project.  Various agencies within the U.S. government 
have engaged in Public-Private partnerships with positive outcomes.  The overwhelming 
majority of these partnership projects have been involved in infrastructure growth.  The 
Department of Energy’s Oak Ridge National Laboratories project is a good example of a 
successful PPP application in U.S. government.     
Oak Ridge National Laboratory near Knoxville, Tennessee, functions as a primary 
research center for scientists and engineers to conduct research in the fields of physics, 
nuclear science, and energy exploration.  The facility has been in existence since World 
War II, when it was used for the famous Manhattan Project.  Since the end of World War 
II the facility has received little to no upkeep or attention.  DOE had identified the 
laboratory as a necessary infrastructure project but lacked adequate current year 
construction funding. 
Using the PPP model, DOE solicited bids from private firms to provide the capital 
requirements to execute the construction project.  Private financing entities would 
provide the funding source to the construction company.  At completion of the project the 
private finance entity then leases the structure to the DOE’s prime facilities contractor 
(GAO 47).   
The Oak Ridge National Laboratories project is just one example of the benefits 
identified with combining public and private finance initiatives.  The Oak Ridge model 
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fits the traditional partnership mold; where the private firm bids-builds-operates the 
project using a lease mechanism to re-coupe expense and generate future revenue.  The 
Oak Ridge project provided DOE the ability to obtain needed infrastructure updates 
without having to provide the up front capital.    
The Oak Ridge National Laboratories project is a textbook example of a 
successful government PPP.  However, the spectrum of Public-Private Partnerships is 
much broader when evaluating the risk responsibility relationship.  Figure 1 (DOT) 
displays the complete spectrum of Public-Private Partnerships in relation to the risk 
incurred by the public or private organization.  The left end of the spectrum, Design Bid 
Build, represents full public responsibility and ensuing risk.  The right side of the 
spectrum, Build Own Operate, similarly represents full private responsibility and 
associated risk.  When evaluating PPP contracts, determining who bears what 
responsibility is critical in determining value for money.  In this case, responsibility and 
level of risk incurred is synonymous.  The following paragraphs will further explain the 
spectrum of PPP’s.  The discussion will begin with the highest risk borne by the 
government, Design Bid Build, transitioning through the risk spectrum, ending with risk 
being completely shouldered by the private sector.   
 






















1. Design Bid Build   
 The design-bid-build relationship is the traditional method used in government 
procurement.  This method uses private partnerships extensively, but limits expansion 
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due to the high up front capital requirements on behalf of the public sector.  This method 
requires full up front funding and is the industry standard for government acquisition 
projects.  This is a PPP in that the government negotiates with private industry to 
complete a project, vice having a government entity complete the project in house.  This 
method is seen predominantly in the procurement of aviation assets.  Private contractors 
are involved in competition to design, bid, and build aircraft.  
2. Private Contract Fee Services 
 The contract fee for services relationship is also referred to as “outsourcing”.  
This relationship is developed by divesting services necessary to the operation of the 
government but can be accomplished by an outside entity.  Generally, any service not 
considered “front-line” can be bundled in a fee-for-service contract.  This method is 
becoming commonplace throughout the public sector, as government agencies look to 
divest themselves of non-critical activities that do not fit the government’s core 
competence.  Typically, these contracts appear as janitorial services, food and beverage 
service, and some security forces.  The public sector has realized that outsourcing these 
activities reduces the manpower requirement and leverages current year budget.   
3.  Design Build 
 The Design-Build partnership is a modification of the Design-Bid-Build 
partnership.  The Design Build model combines the design and building phases into a 
single prime contractor.  This model still requires the public entity to provide all up front 
capital requirements, but shifts some of the risk/ responsibility for design to the builder.   
4.  Build Operate Transfer 
 The Build Operate Transfer model or Government Owned, Contractor Operated 
(GOCO) model provides a bundle of services to the public agency.  The private sector 
partner is responsible for the construction, operation, and maintenance of the project.  
The public entity has the requirement to provide the up front capital, and funding stream 
to build and maintain the project.  The added benefit provided to the public sector is that 
the acquisition and life cycle support cost is fulfilled by a single contractor for a fee.  This 
concept was used by the Australian Government to procure their Armidale coastal patrol 
boats that will be explored in greater detail in a case study in this report.  The Australian 
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government was responsible for the capital and financing of the project, however once 
complete the private contractor retained responsibility for maintenance and up keep.    
5. Design Build Finance Operate 
 The Design Build Finance Operate model bundles the total project cost, offering 
the public entity a comprehensive program.  This partnership provides shared financial 
responsibility for the ownership of the total program.  The Design Build Finance Operate 
partnership is a modification of GOCO where the private agency provides some debt and 
equity financing for the project in return for future income streams.  This type of 
partnership has seen considerable success at the municipal level with road construction.  
Private companies are contracted by the local government to design, build, and operate 
public roads in return for a portion of future toll revenue.  This type of partnership may 
also take the form of Contractor Owned, Government Operated (COGO) if the financing 
were structured in favor of primary private ownership.   
6. Build Own Operate  
 Build Own Operate is the consummate Public Private Partnership.  This model 
allocates the majority of the responsibility for financing, operating, and maintaining the 
project to the private organization.  This type of partnership is commonly referred to as 
Contractor Owned Contractor Operated (COCO) partnership.  The COCO partnership 
places the full up front capital and cost burden on the private organization.  This transfers 
the risk to the private sector for a secured future income stream.  In the U.K. this model is 
also referred to as a Private Finance Initiative (PFI).  
This report will focus on the application of the Design Build Operate (COGO) 
and Build Own Operate models (COCO).  The difference between the models lie in the 
financing mechanism employed.  The PFI/ COCO model retains ownership in the private 
sector, whereas the GOCO allows for Pubic ownership with some use of private 
financing.  This concept is used extensively in the U.K.  The British Ministry of Defense 
has had success with this model in procuring helicopter simulation facilities, and a world 
renowned joint service staff college.  Both projects were entered into by the British 
Ministry of Defense and a consortium of private firms.  The projects, once complete are 
owned and operated by the private firms to provide a service for a fee to the government.  
A full examination of these case studies can be found in chapter V of this report.      
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 The continuum of Public-Private Partnerships begins with simple service 
relationships that exist today, and ends with private firms procuring government 
hardware and providing support services.  Value for money exists throughout the range of 
partnerships based on the program requirements.  But, in today’s austere budget 
environment private finance relationships are more useful to the public sector.  These 
initiatives currently exist, and have demonstrated continued success at the municipal 
government level.  Continued proliferation of these partnerships throughout the public 
sector will prove beneficial in the long run in acquiring end items with limited resources.     
 
B.  SUCCESSFUL PARTNERSHIPS IN U.S. MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 
 Public-Private Partnerships within various governmental agencies throughout the 
United States have been effective and beneficial.  The government has in the past relied 
on private industry for support in designing, building, and operating projects and 
services.  This use of private industry is commonly referred to as outsourcing and has 
become prolific.  However, as public needs continue to build in a fiscally constrained 
environment private industry will be a critical component in the field of procurement.  In 
recent years, municipal government agencies have seen positive results with Privately 
Financed Initiatives.  In particular, the Washington D.C. Police Department has 
successfully entered into a partnership with private firms to acquire a traffic light 
enforcement system.  In doing so, the public sector has been able to limit its financial 
exposure to the project while providing additional public goods and services at no 
additional cost.  Washington D.C. has had success employing PFI partnerships in the 
arena of public safety.       
 
Washington D.C. Automated Traffic Photo Enforcement 
 Principal Partners:  D.C. Metro Police Department and Affiliated Computer 
Services (ACS) 
 Size of Contract:  $5 million 
Scope:  Implementation of Red Light Photo Enforcement Program for Metro D.C. 
areas.   
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Automobile related fatalities are on the rise within most U.S. major metropolitan 
areas.  Washington D.C. Metro Police have identified a method to try and combat the 
rising trend of automobile related casualties, red light photo enforcement.  The D.C. 
Metro Police department has contracted with ACS to design, implement, and run sixty 
photo enforcement facilities throughout greater metro D.C.  ACS is an S&P 500 company 
known globally as a premier technology vendor.  Primarily, ACS is a diversified 
outsourcing company that specializes in information technology and networking systems 
(ACS).     
 ACS will procure cameras, install the system at police designated intersections, 
and run the system at no cost to the taxpayers of Washington D.C.  In return, ACS retains 
a portion of the fine collected from the perpetrator.  The revenue split between ACS and 
the district is volume dependent, with a floor set in favor of the district (57 percent DC 
/43 percent ACS) (National Council for PPP’s Case Study).  However, if infractions drop 
below a level of positive return for ACS, the city of Washington D.C. is not liable or 
required to supplement ACS in any way for the shortfall.  Since the beginning of the 
program, red light infractions have dropped by forty seven percent having provided 
infraction generated revenue in excess of $6 million (National Council for PPP’s Case 
Study).  The Washington D.C. red light enforcement program is not only an effectively 
financed partnership, but has been instrumental in providing better public safety.     
The Red Light Enforcement program is a textbook example of a Contractor Owned 
Contractor Operated partnership.  This type of partnership requires private industry to 
provide for the financing and up front capital in return for future revenue.  This type of 
financing model affords the public entity ability to procure end-items, infrastructure, etc. 
without incurring additional public debt or allocating current year dollars.  The 
Washington D.C. automated traffic photo enforcement project is an example of how 
government agencies are using COCO partnerships to meet requirements in a fiscally 
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III.  RISK TRANSFER 
Growing pressures on the public budget have left the government looking for 
different ways to fund major projects.  In this chapter, we will discuss how the United 
Kingdom (UK) turned to the private sector for help.  By entering in Public Private 
Partnerships, the UK has been able to procure services and assets that they would have 
had to do without had alternative forms of financing not been available.  This chapter will 
focus on the PFI arrangement and the success the UK has had in applying this financing 
technique through better risk allocation and how it can be used as a possible way to 
finance new assets outside of the traditional procurement stream. 
In the UK, Public Private Partnerships are split into three distinct categories.  The 
first and largest deals with the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) where the public sector 
contracts to purchase goods or services on a long-term basis so as to take advantage of 
private sector management skills that are incentivized by having their own money at risk.  
This includes projects where the private sector partner takes on the responsibility for 
providing a public service, including maintaining, enhancing or constructing the 
necessary infrastructure or assets. An example is the UK Ministry of Defense deal for the 
Joint Services Command and Staff College.  The second category is the introduction of 
private sector ownership into state owned businesses using a strategic partner, with equity 
of either a majority or minority stake.  An example of this type is the private contracting 
out of mess hall services where the private contractor is paid on a per meal basis while 
the government retains the ownership of the building and assets involved.  The third 
category deals with selling government services into wider markets and other partnership 
arrangements where private sector expertise and financing are used to exploit the 
commercial potential of government assets.  An example is the public use of aircraft 
training facilities to fill capacity at underutilized facilities.     
The United Kingdom uses PFI to finance large capital assets and services only 
where it offers the best value for money, similar to the concept of lower lifecycle costs in 
the US acquisition cycle.  Similar to the US, the UK recognizes that major capital asset 
procurement must involve the cost of the entire life-cycle not simply the unit itself.  For 
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this reason the lowest cost bidder does not necessarily win the contract.  Also, in the UK, 
another stipulation is value for money benefits in PFI should never come at the expense 
of workers in the form of layoffs or decreased quality of life.  
 The use of PFI in the UK comprises about 11 percent of the country’s budget.  
The UK’s Ministry of Defense (MOD), has 46 PFI projects worth a total of £2.5 billion 
($4.3 billion US at 1.7449 exchange rate).  The total defense budget in FY 2005-2006 is 
$51.1 billion (Defence Budgets), therefore PFI constitutes about 5 percent of the defense 
budget. Their success has been noted in a study released by HM Treasury research of 61 
PFI projects. The key findings were:  
• 89 percent of projects were delivered on time or early 
• All PFI projects in the HM Treasury sample were delivered within 
public sector budgets. No PFI project was found where the unitary 
charge had changed following contract signature – other than where 
user requirements changed 
• 77 percent of public sector managers stated that their project was 
meeting their initial expectations (HM Treasury 4).     
 
The UK defines value for money as follows: “the optimum combination of 
whole-life cost and quality (or fitness for purpose) to meet the user requirement.”(HM 
Treasury 30)  In this sense, they do not allow bias to influence which procurement option 
is best for the need at hand whether it is prime contracting, design and build contracting 
or PFI.  To ensure that PFI is the best option, the UK Government undertakes a full 
evaluation of the costs and benefits including an assessment of risk both to the 
government and the contractor.  One of the primary benefits of PFI is the transfer of risk.  
PFI seeks to ensure that the private sector takes responsibility for the quality of design 
and construction it undertakes, and for long-term maintenance on an asset, so that value 
for money is achieved.  Therefore in a perfect PFI scenario, value for money is achieved 
primarily through proper transfer of risk to the party best poised to limit that risk.  The 
government retains risk of contract change to keep flexibility such as the number of ships 
purchased, or bears the cost of adding a new system to an already designed platform.  The 
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valuation of these risk transfers is what makes these arrangements attractive to the public 
sector.  These concepts are applied later in three case studies from the private sector, in 
the UK the Medium Support Helicopter Aircrew Training Facility, and the Joint Services 
Command and Staff College, and an Australian example in hardware procurement, 
Armidale Patrol Boats.  Key to these projects is the optimal sharing of risk.   
Optimal sharing of risks between the private and public sector is important to 
realizing the best value for money of any PFI arrangement.  There are certain risks that 
are best managed by the Government and to seek to transfer these risks would either not 
be viable or not offer value for money for the public sector.  When risks are shared, 
projects are more likely to be completed on time and on budget. For example, 
construction risk, or the risk associated with the design of a warship are borne by the 
party who is best placed to manage them. In this way, the private sector is incentivized by 
having its capital at risk to perform well, and takes responsibility for the work it 
undertakes.  In case of poor performance, the public sector ensures effective service 
delivery in three ways.  First, quality service delivery is maintained first through 
deductions for poor performance, if the problem persists, the second is replacement of the  
subcontractor, and third, if the discrepancy cannot be improved, ultimate contract 
termination.   An example is the government or private financier firing the food service 
provider for repeated poor performance at the Joint Services Command and Staff College 
and replacing with another food service provider, then the main contractor would be 
deducted for the payment.   
  
A. RISK SHARING 
 The success of a PFI project is seen in how risk is shared.  As previously stated, 
risk that is shared in a PFI contract is placed on the party best situated to mitigate or 
control the risk. This section will explain how risk is allocated among the parties within a 
PFI contract.   The UK Government’s approach to risk in PFI projects does not seek to 
transfer risks to the private sector as an end in itself. Where risks are transferred, it is to 
create the correct disciplines and incentives on the private sector to achieve a better 
outcome.  
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1. Government Risk 
 The general principles behind the Government’s approach to risk-sharing in PFI 
are as follows: 
• The Government underwrites the continuity of public services, and the 
availability of the assets essential to their delivery. 
• The private sector contractor is responsible, and at risk, for its ability 
to meet the service requirements it has contractually agreed to provide. 
The full value of that debt incurred by the project, and the equity 
provided by contractors and third parties, is the cap on the risk 
assumed by the private sector. (34) 
 The UK government retains risk in five areas much the same way a public entity 
would in normal procurement.  The first is associated with date and adequacy for 
delivery.  For instance, if the construction of an asset such as a warship did not have 
enough of a certain capability or beds, then the government assumes the risk and extra 
cost associated with adding more capability, beds, etc. The second is the possibility of a 
future change in public sector requirements.  If the needs of the government change, the 
government retains the responsibility to make alterations within provisions set forth in the 
contract and will incur the cost of making the changes after the contract was signed.  The 
third area is when the standards of delivery set by the public sector sufficiently meet 
public needs.  The public sector retains the risk involved in planning the provision of 
public services, and specifying a procurement of facilities that meets those requirements.  
The fourth area involves the extent to which an asset is used or not used over the 
contract’s life.  This primarily deals with land based facilities.  However this can be 
applied to capital assets such as transport planes, trucks etc.  Finally, the government 
retains the risk of general inflation. 
2. Private Sector Risk 
 Risks that are transferred by contract to the private sector are specifically 
identified and limited (See Appendix II for the Joint Services Command and Staff 
College).  They typically apply to contract terms of 15-30 years and cover five areas.  
The first is meeting required standards of delivery.  If the project’s design (as determined 
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by the private sector) was unable to provide the required service’s needs, the private 
sector would need to pay the cost of correcting the design to bring the item to contractual 
specifications.  This implies that all of the specifications are identified at project 
inception.  Therefore, this type of financing is best used for projects of a specified length 
of time that uses mature technology.  An example is contracting for trucks or other easily 
repeatable capital items that use modern assembly lines and need to be redesigned or 
incur added technology development costs.   PFI financing would be difficult to 
implement for projects which incur high technology development costs because the 
Research and Development program for a specific technology can experience many 
unpredictable set backs and cost overruns.   
 The second area involves cost overrun during construction.  For instance, if after 
the design and construction plans were approved, it is found that more support is needed 
for the weight of a ship system, then there would be no increase in the government’s 
payment.  The cost would be incurred by the private sector to correct the deficiency and 
bring the project in compliance with contract design standards.  In conventional 
procurement the government would be forced to pay the charges.  
 Third is the private sector taking on the risk associated with the timely completion 
of a project, which typically leads to incentive payments for early completion.  If the 
project is delivered early, the private sector stands to profit more through bonus 
payments. However, this can prove disastrous if the project comes in late and the private 
sector incurs extra cost.   
 The fourth area in which the private sector incurs a share of the total risk has to do 
with the underlying costs to the operator of service delivery, and the future costs 
associated with the asset.  This occurs if the private sector takes on an existing asset in a 
PFI project, thereby assuming the risk of any latent defects in the asset which must be 
resolved.  The private sector would need to make these remedies, and cover their cost, in 
order to continue to receive payments for the availability of the asset.  This could apply to 
refueling tankers.  The private sector would assume the costs of the upkeep of the aircraft 
and assume the risk of defect upon delivery from the aircraft manufacturer because they 
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“own” them.   Finally, the private sector holds onto the risk of physical damage to the 
asset while it is in their care (36). 
 Within the area of private sector risk, the total risk is passed to the various 
contractors as they assume a piece of the project.  Figure 2 shows the structure of a 
typical PFI and how the risk is allocated on a project.   
 
Figure 2:  The Consortium Company Joint Venture Model (37) 
 
 
In this structure, the private sector reallocates risk to subcontractors, the most appropriate 
parties to mitigate risks. Typically: 
• The construction contractor, under a subcontract with the consortium 
company, takes the design, construction and completion risk; 
• The service provider, or Facilities management operator, under a  subcontract 
with the consortium company, takes the risk of timely and cost effective 
service provision; 
• Insurers provide protection for risks of damage and business interruption 
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• The consortium company, the Special Purpose Vehicle, its lenders and 
investors are therefore left with a series of residual risks, some of which are 
credit risks on the subcontractors’ performance. 
 The benefits of this consortium joint venture structure are that it permits different 
parties to become involved in the PFI scheme and share the risks effectively. It also can 
involve third parties such as financiers, who must assess the strength of the contractual 
arrangements and the level of support offered as they rely on these when it comes to 
repayment of their loans (37).  An example of third party involvement can be seen in the 
Joint Services Command and Staff College case study and the financing provided though 
the Royal Bank of Scotland discussed in Chapter V. 
 With regards to flexibility and public sector safeguards, the typical PFI contract 
stipulates that the government can make changes in design, or capability.  However they 
will bear the cost of the changes much the same as with traditional procurement.  In the 
event of poor performance, the contract stipulates that the special purpose vehicle can 
hire and fire subcontractors and the government can withhold payments in order to 
maintain the overall quality of the program’s good or service. The revenue loss from 
deductions and penalties provides a powerful incentive for the PFI contractor to correct 
deficiencies.   
 The repercussions of revenue loss are large for the PFI contractor as shareholders 
will see a decline in their returns.  Third party credit providers will be concerned that this 
loss of revenue will increase risk that the PFI contractor will be unable to meet its debt 
service obligations.  Credit providers have contractual rights over the other private sector 
participants in the project, which can enable them to enforce performance against 
contractual obligations. Credit providers have the ability to replace the private sector 
participants in the PFI with other companies better able to deliver to the required 
standard.  In extreme cases, the government retains the right to transfer the entire 
program out of the PFI umbrella in the event of total failure by the private sector.  Upon 
expiration of a standard PFI contract, with rare exceptions the key assets needed to 
continue to deliver public services revert to the public sector free of charge (40). In the 
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US, the government would likely pay the contractor a portion of the asset’s useful value 
or its salvage value.  
3. Cost of Risk 
 Private contractors, investors and bankers evaluate cost of risk in a PFI contract 
by discounting back all future cash flows at a specified discount rate or cost of capital 
which includes an implied risk premium that is assessed to the project.  This rate is 
usually much higher than the government borrowing rate, typically in the US it is the T-
bill borrowing rate or in the UK, the gilt rate.  In a study conducted by the US GAO in 
2001, it was determined that the promise of an internal rate of return of approximately 
15% would draw considerable interest from the private sector. (Ungar 5).   
 A common misperception is that these deals are inherently bad for the 
government because the government’s cost of capital is the lowest.  However, the HM 
Treasury report found with publicly financed procurement, the taxpayer underwrites the 
risk associated with the project.  This risk is then captured in a lower cost of capital to the 
government.  It is the taxpayer that bears the risk with a project, and when a cost overrun 
occurs due to a construction set back for example, it is the taxpayer that bears the cost for 
the overrun.  It is therefore inappropriate to compare a “risk free” cost of capital with the 
private sector cost of capital.  PFI projects therefore provide value for money through the 
private sector taking on, pricing, and managing the risk that they can control.  This cost 
savings is then passed onto the government. (HM Treasury 42) 
 In the public’s interest, for PFI, risks are priced individually for each project 
option.  The discounted costs of these risk-adjusted options can then be compared to 
accept the best project or option when considering  risk and uncertainty.  HM Treasury 
found that in traditional public procurement, the public sector pays for risk not in its 
borrowing, which for the government is at non-risk rates, but when the risks materialize 
and must be covered. (42)  The valuation of the risk that is passed from the public sector 




IV. THE PUBLIC SECTOR COMPARATOR 
 One major difficulty in comparing the value of a lease to the value of a direct 
purchase is valuing the allocation of risk.  It is easy to compare the two alternatives using 
discounted annual cash flows and the net present value associated with each.  However, 
in quantifying the greatest advantage associated with a lease, valuing the allocation of 
risk is not so easy.  The Public Sector Comparator (PSC) is an attempt to quantify the 
value of this transfer of risk and give it a monetary value to better compare the two 
mechanisms so the government is better able to determine which proposal delivers the 
better Value for Money (VFM).   
 The PSC is a technique that gained acceptance by Great Britain in the 1990’s 
(HM Treasury release).  During the early portion of the decade, Great Britain found itself 
with a variety of public goods needing refurbishment, but did not want to significantly 
increase taxes or the national debt.  The government’s answer was to embrace PPP’s to 
make the improvements.  Great Britain was not a stranger to privatizing public goods, but 
still faced a major obstacle in the acceptance of PPP’s.  The greatest difficulty was 
proving that a greater value of money could be earned in a PPP than a traditional 
procurement program.  The PSC allows valuation of risk transfer to be added to the 
public procurement option cost structure.  This ensures that public procurement options 
and PFI options are compared equally.  The following sections outline how the PSC is 
constructed. 
A. COMPONENTS OF THE PSC 
 The goal of the PSC is to improve the comparison of the purchase and PPP 
options.  In order to more accurately depict the costs and benefits of each financing 
option it is important to consider all the costs and benefits of each.  A PSC is a function 
of four variables expressed as follows (Partnerships Victoria 7): 
 
PSC = Transferable risk + Competitive Neutrality + Raw PSC + Retained Risk 
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Each of the above four variables constitutes a portion of the value of the contract and is 
important to consider when evaluating the value of a PPP.  They will be defined below. 
1. Competitive Neutrality 
 Competitive neutrality is an attempt to negate any financial advantages or 
disadvantages the government enjoys over the private sector.  For instance, the 
government does not pay taxes giving it an advantage over the private sector.  
Conversely, a private firm will not face the scrutiny public sector project may face.  The 
competitive neutrality assigns a value to these factors and places them into PSC.      
2. Raw PSC 
The Raw PSC is a calculation of how much the government would have to pay in 
a traditional acquisition process.  The Raw PSC is comprised of three variables:  capital 
costs, operating costs and third-party revenue.  As shown in the equation below 
(Partnerships Victoria 24), these are the values used in comparing lease versus buy 
alternatives: 
 
Raw PSC = (Operating Costs – Third Party Revenue) + Capital Cost    
 
Operating and Capital costs are those costs associated with the purchase, 
operation and maintenance of the good or service.  Capital costs are all costs (direct or 
indirect) that are associated with providing the good or service.  Third party revenue is 
that revenue that may be lost by a government owned facility which provided services to 
the private sector.  For instance, if the government is deciding whether to privatize a 
shipyard and pay a private firm for services or maintain a government operated shipyard, 
the potential lost revenue from services the government may provide to the commercial 
sector may be subtracted from the costs of operating the shipyard.   
3. Transferable Risk 
 Transferring risk to the party best able to mitigate that risk is one of the greatest 
advantages of a PPP and one of the most often overlooked variables by those opposed to 
PPP’s as a method of procurement.  By transferring the risks to different parties in a 
contract, the project should increase the public sector’s value for money.  An increased 
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value for money for the public sector and profit for the private sector is a winning 
situation for all parties involved. 
4. Retained Risk 
 Retained Risk represents the cost associated with risk that will be assumed by the 
government.  The key for a successful PFI is to transfer the risk to the party best able to 
mitigate that risk as shown in Figure 3 (Partnerships Victoria 52) 
 
Figure 3:  Optimal Risk Allocation 
 
 
With Value for Money depicted on the vertical axis and Risk allocation on the horizontal 
access, the curved line represents how the value for money increases as risk is transferred 
among parties.  The value for money increases rapidly until the optimal risk transfer point 
is met and then the amount of risk transfer begins to adversely affect the value for money.  
The key for a successful PPP is to reach this optimal level because risk is properly 
distributed among parties and all parties receive the maximum benefit. 
 
B. CALCULATING RISK 
 The dispersion of risks throughout the parties in a government project may be a 
great advantage for the PPP options, but it is also hard to accurately quantify risks.  The 
process is very subjective and requires some level of risk.  An effective means of 
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establishing a baseline level for risk follows the steps below (Partnerships Victoria 
32,33):  
1. Identify risks 
2. Quantify consequences associated with each risk 
3. Estimate the probability of each risk occurring 
4. Calculate the value of risk 
 
1. Identifying risks 
 There is a broad range of risks associated with any project.  These risks may 
include those associated with the contract and financing to those incurred during 
construction, operation or possible destruction.  The key is developing a list of risks that 
are incurred at every step in the procurement process.  This task can be more easily 
accomplished with greater accuracy by conferring with subject matter experts and/or 
consultants.    
2. Quantifying Consequences 
 Quantifying the consequences may be even more subjective than identifying the 
risks of the project.  Determining point estimates may be extremely difficult and may 
represent a “best guess” in a given scenario.  Estimates can be made using either a risk 
matrix or historical data, but the goal should be to develop a reasonable assessment of 
possible consequences of specific risks not a concrete value for the potential cost to the 
government. 
3. Probability of risk   
 The probability of risk is best explained as the chance of the risk identified being 
realized.  There are a variety of methods to develop these values, but again the process is 
subjective in nature and will provide only an estimate.   
 Although assigning a monetary value to the risk associated with a given project is 
a very subjective process, it is naïve to completely disregard risk.  It is better to attempt to 
value additional costs and slightly miss the mark, than to completely disregard these costs 
and be grossly optimistic. 
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C. THE VALUE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR COMPARATOR 
 As depicted in Figure 4 (Partnerships Victoria 11), the sum of the four 
components which make up the PSC are equal to the real costs associated with given 
project.   
 
Figure 4:  Components of PSC 
 
 Figure 4 shows three separate bids for a given project.  The PSC bid depicts the 
expected cost of the project broken down into the different elements of the PSC.  The two 
alternative bids only depict the overall expected cost for each bid.  The PSC allows the 
government to see the true value of a PPP bid.  Without considering the risks associated 
with service and acquisition the true costs to the government are not reflected and the 
procurement option will most likely appear to be the better option.  By taking the risks 
into account the government is better able to compare all the costs associated with 
procurement and determine the best Value for Money solution.  Using these risk transfer 
concepts, the following chapter outlines three case studies of successful alternative forms 
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V. CASE STUDIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Our intent in this research effort is to present three separate case studies and discuss how 
each case was evaluated individually based on value for money, risk exposure, and 
affordability.  Additionally provided for clarification and background is an introduction 
to Serco Inc.  Serco is the primary conduit between the PPP’s and was helpful in 
generating this report.  Finally, a discussion of critical components of a Private Finance 
Initiative will be discussed.   
The three case studies are described briefly as follows: 
 1. MOD Medium Support Helicopter Aircrew Facility   
The project involves three separate private companies working in concert to 
finance, design, build, and service a helicopter training facility (COCO) The contract 
includes $220 million in hard assets, a 20 year life, and an option to bring in third-party 
revenue.  The contract was valued at $605 million through 20 years.   
 2. MOD Joint Services Command and Staff College   
This venture involves two independent private firms contracted to finance, design, 
build, and operate a joint service military college (COCO).  The contract includes $420 
million in hard assets with a life of 30 years.   
3. Australian Armidale Patrol Boat’s  
This project incorporates traditional government hardware procurement with a 
private financed initiative to support life cycle costs.  Several private companies formed a 
consortium to build and operate 12 Navy Patrol Boats (GOCO).  The contract is valued at 
$553 million involving construction and a 15 year service life.  
 
B. SERCO INC. 
 Serco emerged in 1986 as a spin-off of General Electric Company designed to 
focus on facilities management, system engineering, and support services.  By 1987 
Serco had established itself as a separate company home based in the U.K.  In 1994 Serco 
entered North America, focusing on the Canadian market (Serco).  However, by 1998 the 
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UK partnership market had begun an evolution toward Private Finance Initiatives (PFI) 
where private companies purchase hard assets, bundle a service contract, and sell a 
capability to the public sector.  Serco then began joining consortiums of companies in 
similar businesses to compete in the next evolution of Public Private Partnerships-Private 
Finance Initiatives.  To date Serco has 600 existing contracts in over 35 countries 
employing over 35,000 personnel worldwide (Serco).  In this research Serco Inc. is the 
common link between the three case studies.  Serco Inc. has been successful in 
pioneering the Private Finance Initiative in the U.K. and introducing the concept to North 
America.  Finally, Serco serves as an example of private sector interest in the evolution 
of government procurement.   
 
C. PRIVATE FINANCE INITIATIVES 
A growing concern in today’s military hardware procurement sector is obtaining 
value for the limited resources available.  Similar to DOD, the MOD is fiscally 
constrained in procurement programs by budget shortfalls and cost growth.  However, in 
order to provide for increased operating leverage, the U.K. Ministry of Defense, post 
1998, emphasized using PPP/ PFI as the desired procurement mechanism.  The MOD 
believes it increases its value for money and reduces its capital exposure in current year 
dollars.  The expected value for money is based on the following premise (Kaye): 
• The MOD expects improved quality of services through opportunities for 
innovation and application of latest commercial techniques. 
• Risk transfer to the private sector through the use of appropriate incentive 
contracts. 
• Efficiency gains by exposing staff to private sector management, commercial 
and financial skills.   
The above assumptions, coupled with the necessity to expand operational capability, and 
value for money over time represent the value proposition put forth by the private sector.  
The MOD further details six primary factors critical to implementing a PFI program and 
retaining value for money (Kaye): 
• Risk Transfer 
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• Output Base Specification 
• Long Term Contract 
• Performance Measurements & Incentives 
• Competition 
• Private Sector Management Skills 
 
In showcasing these programs, this paper will continue to promote developing 
viable options for future defense acquisition projects.  Additionally, by evaluating the 
transfer of risk to private sector companies, coupled with a diverse stakeholder 
consortium we intend to show true value for money.     
 
D . MEDIUM SUPPORT HELICOPTER AIRCREW TRAINING FACILITY   
 The characteristics of this project are as follows: 
• Royal Air Force (RAF) Helicopter aircrew training facility in support of multi 
mission medium lift, Puma, Merlin, Chinook helicopters: 
o Puma   
 
o Merlin   
 





• Located at RAF Benson in Oxford 
• Contractor:  CVS Aircrew Training PLC. (CVS) 
o CAE Electronics Ltd. (CAE) 
o Vega Group Plc. (Vega) 
o Serco Inc. (Serco) 
• $250 million capital Project Cost with a 20 year service contract valued at $605 
million through 20 years. 
1.  Background 
 The medium support helicopter training facility located at RAF Benson is 
designed to teach all facets of aviation to RAF helicopter Pilots.  The facility is equipped 
with a tactical control center designed to simulate a military flying environment, 
computer based trainers to support ground school, and six fully integrated motion control 
helicopter simulators.  The training staff is comprised entirely of civilian helicopter pilots 
and qualified ground training instructors.  The primary intent of the facility is to reduce 
the flight hour requirements on the actual flying squadrons.  The medium lift helicopter 
mission requirements are tactically diverse.  The missions require crews to operate 
tactically under low light conditions in potentially hostile environments.  Simulator flight 
training reduces the risk inherent with operating an aircraft in real conditions.  The RAF 
can generate cost savings by reducing flight hours and eliminating the risk associated 
with operating fleet aircraft in dangerous training environments.  The project viability 
rests in the cost savings generated by the aircraft flight hours saved in addition to 
efficiencies gained through using commercial sources to run the project. 
 The contract was awarded to CVS in October 1997 by the Defense Procurement 
Agency (DPA).  CVS was formed by CAE Electronics, simulator manufacturer; Vega 
Group, computer technology provider; Serco, facility operators and aviation expertise 
provider.   
2. Scope   
 The Ministry of Defense Procurement Agency identified a genuine need; reduce 
flying hour cost while maintaining pilot proficiency and quality.  In developing an 
analysis of alternatives, the MOD identified three potential courses of action:  1.) Do 
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nothing; continue using current training devices until beyond repair and then purchase 
new devices.  2.) Provide for the minimum requirements; meet the need half way and 
limit the financial breadth of the contract.  3.) Provide for the training needs as evaluated 
(HM Treasury Task Force 6).   
The third option was chosen based on the economic value gained as evaluated 
through their internal analysis.  However, the economic value gained is contingent upon 
the “quality” and “usage” of the simulators being negotiated.  These are  key cost drivers 
that require considerable capital expenditure at the inception of the project.  Due to the 
large capital outlay requirement necessary for construction, and constrained financial 
resources typically confronting government agencies, the MOD identified a private 
finance initiative as a viable option.  Additionally, the Ministry of Defense firmly 
believes that incorporating the private sector in all aspects of procurement can be 
beneficial.  Sir Robert Walmsley, Chief Executive of the Defense Procurement Agency 
states (HM Treasury Task Force 1): 
 A significant outcome has been to show that the role of the private 
sector in defense can be widened through the use of PFI contracts, and that 
substantial value for money improvements can be achieved. 
 -Sir Robert Walmsley, Chief Executive Defense Procurement Agency 
  
CVS was contracted to design, build, and operate the medium support helicopter 
training facility.  In the context of our analysis this contract embodies the pure definition 
of a COCO. The contractor, CVS, will undertake the entire project including soliciting 
private institutions to provide the necessary equity to finance the building phase.  The 
alternative option evaluated by the MOD procurement service follows a more traditional 
GOCO format in which the bulk of the initial capital outlay would fall to the government 
agency to provide in the first year.   
 The key concept of this undertaking was to provide the MOD with the following 
equipment and services (HM Treasury Task Force 5): 
• 3 Chinook HC Mk 2 Dynamic Mission Simulators 
• 2 Merlin HC Mk 3 Dynamic Mission Simulators 
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• 1 Puma HC Mk 1 Dynamic Mission Simulators 
• Aircrew CRM training 
• Computer Based Training Package for Chinook and Merlin 
• Comprehensive Ground School 
• Local Area Network Connectivity for Multiple Unit Simulation 
• Facilities and Support for the Simulators and Ground School 
The helicopter training facility and associated support structures are located at RAF 
Benson in Oxfordshire U.K.  The simulator facility location was chosen in order to 
optimize training and minimize traveling time to operational airfields.    The Merlin and 
Puma aircraft currently operate from RAF Benson while the Chinook aircraft have to be 
flown in when necessary from RAF Odiham (50 Km South) (Benson).  Aircraft 
proximity to the training facility is a critical part of the contract.  The MOD clearly stated 
that a large component of the comparative analysis consider the fuel cost savings from 
using simulators vice aircraft.  However, at the conclusion of simulator and ground 
school training, students must qualify in actual fleet aircraft.  Long transit times that 
cannot be used for training purposes simply increase the overhead involved, and detract 
from the viability of the project.   
3. Contract 
 The MOD entered into a 40 year contract with CVS to design, build, and operate 
the medium support aircrew training facility.  The MOD is obligated to 20 years of 
guaranteed usage.  The second 20 year period of the contract will be reevaluated at the 
completion of the first 20 year portion.  The MOD is not obligated to continue after the 
first 20 years, and can cancel without financial recourse.  The contract, from the MOD 
point of view, is designed to provide a service for a fee.  The MOD in essence is 
purchasing a capability vice procuring a simulator facility.  The construction risk and 
success of training efficiencies is placed on the contractor.  The contractor will only be 
paid for quality results and the successful completion of training for each pilot.   
 The payment function of the contract is based on MOD actual usage, quality of 
product, and availability.  The MOD is billed at an agreed upon rate based on anticipated 
usage.  The hourly rate is gradually reduced over time through the 20th year of contract 
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life.  The necessity for a scaled fee was imposed by the banks due to the front end loaded 
capital requirement (Symes).  Accordingly, the MOD is billed proportionally to the hours 
used in excess of contract or penalized for under usage.  Similarly, the contractor is 
penalized for lack of quality service or inability to provide training if scheduled.  This 
payment scheme incentivizes both parties to maximize potential usage of the assets.   
Additionally, due to the cyclic nature of MOD requirements, the contract was 
designed for only 80 percent of actual MOD usage requirement.  Even if the MOD 
required 100 percent of its contractual obligation, 1/3 facility capacity would still remain, 
allowing CVS to solicit third-party usage.  Third-party facility usage is beneficial to the 
MOD and CVS because revenue generated by outside sources is divided proportionally 
between the MOD and CVS.  The amount of third-party scheduling is contingent and 
biased to the MOD contractual requirements.  The MOD retains priority over simulator 
services.  This type of multi-party contract, where outside revenue can be generated, is 
beneficial to the government and primary PFI contractor.  A multi-party initiative such as 
this provides the potential for underutilized government assets (land) to be tied to 
procurement projects with revenue offsets, helping reduce the overall cost to the 
government.  Public Private Partnerships help take advantage of underutilized 
government capacity.   
4. Contractor   
 The contractor, CVS, can be divided into two separate companies with different 
contractual obligations.  In order to understand stakeholder requirements and incentives 
in relation to the contractor, we will discuss the role of the asset and operating companies 
individually.  Stakeholder relationships are further defined by identifying the equity share 
holders, debt holders (banks), and contracting agency (MOD).  Figure 5 below 
graphically represents the interconnectedness of all participating entities (HM Treasury 
Task Force 8).    






Figure 5:  Medium Support Helicopter Aircrew Training Facility Contract Structure 
 
 
a. Asset Company 
The asset company is responsible for financing, designing, building, 
owning the facilities, leasing the land, purchasing the simulators, and purchasing the 
computer equipment.  It is also the primary conduit for the financing liability.  The 
primary contracting companies will act as sales agents; CAE will sell the simulators, and 
Vega will sell the computer equipment to the asset company.   
The primary companies involved in the contract, (CAE, Vega, Serco) are 
tied directly to CVS via equity provided at project inception.  The primary contractors, in 
concert with Charterhouse Capital Inc. provided 20 percent of the required financing 
through equity ($44 million).  The major portion of the financing (80 percent) was 
through debt involving a consortium of six banks.  The leading bank, HSBC, acts as 
consortium lead (Symes).  The asset company is a mechanism that unifies the primary 
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contractor’s liabilities as a single entity.  In reality it is just a subdivision of CVS 
Aircrew.  However, the division of asset and operating companies shields the MOD and 
contractor consortium from the liabilities.  This model affords the primary contracting 
companies the opportunity to retain project ownership and yet minimize their exposure to 
risky debt.   
The asset company, once fully developed entered into a lease agreement 
with the operating company.  In this case both companies are subdivisions of CVS.  The 
lease agreement between the asset and operating companies is essentially a funds transfer 
mechanism used to satisfy senior debt payments (bank loan), and distribute remaining 
profit as interest on dividends to the equity partners.  The asset company is invisible to 
the MOD on a daily basis.  The asset company operates independent of the operating 
company and is only connected to the MOD via liabilities documents discussed later.   
b. Operating Company 
The operating company is the link between the contractor consortium and 
the MOD.  The operating company is the face of CVS and is responsible for soliciting 
business whether it is from the MOD contract or third-party interests.  The operating 
company is responsible for facilities maintenance, simulator maintenance, ground school 
administration, simulator scheduling and administration, and providing instructors. The 
operating company will subcontract the day-to-day services necessary to sustain 
operations.  Unlike the asset company, the operating company may have upwards of 50 
subcontracts.  The subcontracts are awarded by the operating company for necessary 
services and do not impact the agreement with the MOD.    In the case of the MSHATF 
the primary subcontracts were awarded to Serco, CAE, and associated partners for 
maintenance and manpower.    
Additionally, the operating company is responsible for administering the 
contract with the MOD.  Primary contract administration services are also subcontracted 
and include quality assurance, revenue collection, and dispute settlements.  From the 
MOD perspective, this acquisition resembles a fee-for-service contract, because 
payments are made to a private company for services without ownership.  
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Finally, the operating company is also the agency responsible for soliciting third-
party usage and allocating profit from the extra use.  Since the government contracted 
usage is set to 80 percent of 75 percent capacity, there is an incentive to the operating 
company to generate supplementary revenue.  Part of the revenue generated is used to 
offset the MOD cost, per the primary contract.  However the remainder is pure profit, 
because there are no additional costs incurred.  Third-party usage charge is generally 
$1,500 per hour, and traditionally booked in two-hour increments or greater (Symes).  
This option could prove to be quite lucrative to the MOD and CVS.     
c. Banks 
HSBC is the lead of a six bank consortium involved in providing the debt 
leveraged capital for the helicopter training project.  The banks entered into an agreement 
with the asset company to provide the required capital (80 percent asset value).  In order 
to secure the line of credit, the banks required a 20 percent equity share and a “tripartite 
agreement” with the MOD and operating company.  The bank consortium deemed it 
necessary to contractually bind all interested parties in order to allocate risk in a more 
equitable fashion.  The asset company generates revenue from the lease agreement with 
the operating company.  The operating company is bound by contract to the MOD to 
provide a service for a fee.  However, by implementing a tripartite agreement, the MOD 
and the bank consortium become bound in the event the MOD exercises an option to exit 
the contract.  This stipulation only becomes an issue if the MOD breaks the contract 
within the first twenty years of service.  But, with 80 percent of the debt financed, the 
bank consortium wanted this protection if the MOD exercised this option (Symes).  This 
level of scrutiny is common in the private sector and effectively used to allocate risk 
equitably.  Additionally, the private companies must complete a detailed financial 
analysis to sell the concept to private banks.  This level of financial analysis and 
evaluation of risk required by the banks is essential to the growth of PFI projects.  
d. Equity Shareholders 
The primary equity shareholders are the three contract companies (CAE, 
Vega, Serco) with Charterhouse Capital as a third-party interest.  CAE holds the majority 
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of equity interest (10 percent) with Serco trailing as the minority (1.8 percent) equity 
partner (McNaught).  
The three contracting companies play an additional role as service 
providers over the life of the contract.  The service package is critical to understanding 
value for money from the private company’s perspective.  Without the service package 
there is no need for a long-term contract and the deal reverts back to an outright purchase.  
The contract length and service requirements are private industry’s reward for risk 
incurred by providing the up front capital.  The mechanism that connects the service 
providers with the equity shareholders is the operating company.  The operating company 
provides for services by entering into contracts with the equity providers for building 
maintenance, instructor pilots, and various other facility management services. 
  The risk associated with design and construction as well as interest rate 
fluctuations falls to the asset company.  The asset company is financially backed by the 
primary contracting companies in the form of equity and the bank consortium via debt.  
The asset company is the mechanism that generates equity growth for the shareholders 
after senior debt is satisfied.  The equity growth is independent of any fee-for-service 
contracts levied by the operating company.  In the case of the CVS consortium, equity 
return coupled with long-term fee-for-service contracts is the value for money 
proposition. 
e. MOD 
The MOD entered into a forty-year contract with the CVS operating 
company.  The MOD is financially obligated through the first twenty years, and can 
choose to continue through an additional twenty.  The MOD bears no liability of asset 
ownership, facility maintenance cost, procurement cost, etc. during or at the end of the 
contractually obligated period.  The MOD pays a fee for service to CVS, the operating 
company.  The fee is based on actual usage rates and is downward adjusted over time 
with offsets from third-party usage.  In keeping with standard fee for service contract 
obligations, the MOD is penalized for scheduled time not used, early exit of contract, and 
changes to training not specifically stipulated in the original contract.  However, the 
MOD bears no responsibility of ownership or requirement to purchase the assets at the 
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conclusion of the contract.  From the perspective of the MOD this is a service not 
procurement contract. 
5. Risk 
 The transfer of risk from the public to private sector used by PPP/ PFI models 
such as the MSHATF ensures the value for money.  The most significant level of risk 
transferred is in two categories, construction-project overruns and performance 
justification.  Government procurement has a long standing tradition of soliciting the 
lowest bid contract, not value, resulting in significant slippage and cost overrun.  The 
PFI/ PPP model transfers the initial high risk portion of the acquisition, where the large 
up front capital requirement exists, to the private sector.  The private sector has, over 
time, developed effective risk matrices and is efficient in dealing with this environment.  
In short, the true value for money does not lie in a dollar for dollar financing comparison, 
but in the cost of risk avoided.    
 The MSHATF project, in keeping with MOD finance department regulations, was 
evaluated against a Public Sector Comparator (PSC) designed exclusively to evaluate this 
project.  The PSC and contractors independently evaluated the project on a full cost basis 
including cost of capital, physical construction cost, and risk incurred.  The primary 
difference between the contractor evaluation and the PSC is in the risk at project 
inception.  The following excerpt is from the risk/ transfer value for money chapter of the 
MOD finance department case study (HM Treasury Task Force 17): 
4.1.4 The most significant risks to be valued and added to the PSC were: 
• Construction Overruns.  The main risks that were not addressed in 
cost terms by a conventional fixed-price contract were planning 
risks and delay in entry into service.  Because of the greater 
incentive to deliver on time inherent in a PFI contract it was 
assumed that any delay in entry into service would be significantly 




• Performance Failures.  Down time of the simulators was expected 
to be much less under the PFI than under conventional 
procurement because of the greater penalties/incentives under the 
PFI contract.              
 
 From the government perspective, the true value for money proposition is 
transferring project ownership to the private sector during high risk evolutions.  The 
private sector, in turn, solicits debt and equity providers to evaluate and enter into project 
ownership.  Because of the number of private parties involved, the project is evaluated 
several times and must withstand a high level of financial inquiry.  The public sector does 
not entertain this level of scrutiny, and will commit to higher levels of risk without 
mitigating circumstances. 
The primary reason for the difference in evaluation techniques is due to the 
difference in focus between the government and private industry.  The government is 
concerned with keeping cost within a reasonable margin, while private business is 
focused on maximizing profit potential.  For these reasons, the MSHATF contract shifted 
the high risk portion of the project to the private sector, but provided fiscal incentives to 
arrive on target, and on price.  Additionally, the nature of the project led to further risk 
discussions and reasonable load sharing between the MOD and CVS.  Appendix I 
contains a break down of the risk sharing matrix used for the MSHATF contract (HM 
Treasury Task Force 22).   
 The MSHATF contract was let in October 1997 and valued at $605 million 
though the first 20 years of contract life (HM Treasury Task Force 4).  For evaluation 
purposes the MOD employed the PSC model provided by the UK treasury and evaluated 
several different risk profiles.   The MOD using PSC analysis valued the contract 
between $695 million to $726 million through 20 years of life.  Both the PSC and 
contractor analysis assumed the same MOD utilization rates (80 percent), 66 percent 
capacity available for third party usage, and a 6 percent discount rate provided by the 
treasury (HM Treasury Task Force 7).  Ultimately, the PFI model proved to be the 
optimal financing mechanism, besting the public procurement option by a conservative 
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15 percent (Symes).  However, future third-party sales may further offset the MOD’s 
cost.  This payment mechanism limits the potential cost to the MOD by setting their take-
or-pay rate, but does not limit profit sharing potential generated by third-party interest.  
By providing the potential for an income stream in the financing mechanism of the 
project, traditional military cyclic usage could be dampened by third-party revenue.  This 
type of contractual obligation displays the potential value to the government involved in 
using private sector financing techniques.      
 
E.  JOINT SERVICES COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE 
1. Background 
The Joint Services Command and Staff College was conceived in 1994 and 
started temporarily in 1997 to serve as the Ministry of Defence Tri-service officer 
training college.  It is located on a 100 acre site at Shrivenham and boasts a ₤90 million 
45,500 square meter new facility which includes: 
• 7 lecture theater 70-450 seat capacity 
• 67 syndicate rooms and library 
• 170 offices and 2 conference rooms 
• Mess facilities including 2 bars 
• 483 single bedrooms 
• 290 residential homes 
• Extensive leisure and sports facilities (United Kingdom 1) 
 
The opening of the new College enabled the UK Ministry of Defense to consolidate 
three separate military colleges to create a truly joint education experience.  The College 
trains 2,000 people a year with a staff of 160.  Its forecast expenditure in 2001-2002 is 
₤35 million (United Kingdom 1).   The funding for the project was originally going to be 
by traditional procurement using public funds.  The Ministry of Defense then experienced 
affordability problems as the price tag rose too high.  Private Financing Initiative (PFI) 
was selected to fund the college, housing, teaching and facilities management.  PFI 
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funding was found to be 10 percent less than traditional public procurement by the U.K. 
National Audit Organization (the US equivalent is the GAO).     
2. Timeline 
The following timeline in Figure 6 annotates the key events in the creation and 
building of the Joint Services Command and Staff College.  The project was delayed a 
year because the decision to move from traditional procurement to PFI led to more 
intense contract negotiations due to the transfer of risk and the question of how to value 
those transfers. 
Figure 6:  Chronology of Events for JSCSC 
 
(United Kingdom 2) 
 
3. PFI Contract 
Once the Department turned to PFI, invitations for bids were received from four 
companies.  The contract was awarded to Defence Management, a special purpose 
company wholly owned by Laing Investments and Serco Investments.  Under the 30 year 
contract Defence Management had to design, build and finance the permanent facilities 
for the college.  It then has to provide a range of support services.  “In return for making 
the facilities available and providing the support services to the required standards 
Defence Management is paid ₤26 million a year (at 2000 prices).”(17)  The Royal Bank 
of Scotland provided the upfront financing to fund the school construction to the 
overarching holding company of Defence Management which contains two parts, the 
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construction component (Laing Construction) and the facilities management component 
(Serco Aerospace).  Serco then subcontracted hotel and catering services to Eurest and 
the faculty/staff and academic portion to Kings College, London.  The table in Figure 7 
summarizes the relationships of the PFI parties involved in the deal.   
 
 
Figure 7:  JSCSC PFI parties 
 
Additionally, the structure of the fee received by Serco totals ₤26 million per year 
for 30 years and is summarized in Figure 8 (18).   This fee was based on three parts: 
student place days, residential place days, and married student quarters weeks.  This 
arrangement ensured that Serco was being paid for the services they provided.  The 
student rate covers the faculty, staff, and maintenance of the facility as well as a portion 
of the building cost.  The residential place days covers the building and maintenance of 
the single quarters, and likewise for the married student quarters.  The contract also 
stipulated a level of guaranteed usage, meaning they promised to fill to the agreed 
number in the first column of Figure 8.  Additionally, for extra capacity, Serco received a 
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non-guaranteed usage fee per extra student day, resident, or married quarter week that the 
school used to reflect the marginal cost incurred by Serco.  The payment base is ₤26 
million but increases as the school reaches full capacity over the specified minimum 
usage levels.  
 
Figure 8:  JSCSC PFI fee structure 
 
 
 The school was built to have a 60-year useful life.  The PFI contract stipulates that 
at the end of the 30-year contract, the school would revert back to the Ministry of 
Defence at no cost, or they can choose to leave it with Defence Management.  This 
ensures maximum flexibility to the department.  Defence Management would have 
recovered all costs of the design, and construction of the school, as well as the facilities 
management and maintenance of the school (22). 
4.  Risk Transfer  
The attractiveness of the PFI option is the ability to transfer risks to the party that 
is best situated to mitigate that risk.  For example, if construction lasts longer than 
expected, the risk was allocated to Defence Management.  They did not receive any 
payment until the start of the service delivery.  This allocation provides a very strong 
incentive to finish the project on time.  In traditional procurement, the government pays 
for most if not all schedule delays, which explicitly leads to cost overruns.  Appendix II  
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illustrates the risk that was transferred to other parties from the PFI contract and was 
included in the NAO report. 
 Overall the NAO found that,  
the Department and its financial advisors, Price Waterhouse, valued the 
amount of risk transferred to the private sector at ₤26 million and added it 
to the public sector capital option.  This addition was necessary in order to 
put the costings of the PFI and publicly financed options on an equal 
footing as the PFI bidder included its own allowance for these risks in its 
bid price.  At 13 percent of the public sector capital options’ base cost, the 
risk allowance on this project is at the low end of the range of between 10 
percent and 40 percent of such allowances on the other PFI projects 
examined by the NAO (20).   
Figure 9 illustrates the cost comparison between the public sector option and the PFI 
option. 
 
Figure 9:  PFI vs. Public Procurement for JSCSC 
 
 The NAO concluded that value for money was achieved in this project as 
compared to a similar public sector capital option.  The project was completed on budget 
and on time and it proved affordable and flexible to the government.  The total project 
was delivered a year later than previously expected, but that was due to the switch from 
public to private funding and additional negotiations in risk transfer before a final 
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contract could be signed.  The school has been a success, receiving favorable reviews 
from students and a construction and design award.   
The department considered that the proposed deal brought non-financial 
benefits.  The public sector capital option would not meet its requirements 
as well as the PFI because of the limitations of (alternate) site which 
would entail the need for two separate buildings and thus make for an 
environment that was less joint than required.  The alternative option of 
remaining at (the original) site and upgrading the facilities there was likely 
to be more expensive and difficult to implement due to problems in 
obtaining planning permission, and would bring fewer operational benefits 
(20). 
 The project provided better affordability to the government.  If they had to 
provide all of the funding up front (in this case ₤197 million) as is done in traditional 
public projects, they could not afford a joint professional institution.  This deal spaces out 
payments and transfers risk down to the contractors.  Additionally, the contractors do not 
receive a dime until the project is finished, and students are admitted and taking classes.   
 
F. THE ARMIDALE CLASS PATROL BOAT 
 
 





1. Background  
a. Department of Defence Need 
 In November of 1999, the Australian Department of Defence looked to 
replace its aging patrol boat fleet.  The legacy fleet of 15 Freemantle Class Patrol Boats 
(FCPB), commissioned between 1980 and 1984, had all exceeded their original 15-year 
service life and an initial life extension (ANAO 23).  The decision was made to terminate 
further extensions of the FCPB service life and focus on the development of a 
replacement system. 
 
b. Defence Maritime Services (DMS) 
An equal partnership between Serco-Australia and P&O Maritime was 
established in 1997.  P&O Maritime Services is a subsidiary of P&O Services Ltd which 
focuses on “providing specialist shipping and related logistics (P&O).”  Beginning as a 
single ship chartering and ship agency in the 1960s, P&O Services now serves a variety 
both government and commercial customers.  Both parent companies brought different 
expertise to the agreement: Serco possessed the necessary aptitude in project 
management, Public-Private Partnerships, and bidding methodology: while P&O 
Maritime provided the needed expertise in ship operations, supply, financing and 
engineering (Chisholm). 
DMS was initially formed and awarded a ten-year contract to provide Port 
services and support craft to the Australian Defence Force (DMS).  This partnership was 
possible as the result of the Australian government’s launching of the Commercial 
Support Program in 1993.  To reduce inefficiencies found in government activities and 
manpower limitations, this program aimed to outsource more of the government’s non-
core activities.   
2. The Acquisition Process 
In replacing the aging patrol boat fleet, the Defence Material Organisation (DMO) 
used a two phase approach: Phase 0 and Phase 1.  Phase 0 began with the decision to 
replace the FCPB’s.  The desired capability the Department of Defence identified was the 
ability “to provide 3000 patrol days of annual operational availability of specified 
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performance (DMO website).”  In addition to the desired operational days, the 
Department of Defence also required performance specifications and a certain level of 
surge capacity, but the principle requirement remained 3,000 operational days.   
By desiring a capability rather than a given number of ships, the Department of 
Defence allowed contractors to meet these capability requirements, most notably the 
operating days, as they deemed most efficient.  For instance, the number of patrol boats 
provided may vary as long as the specified performance requirements and 3,000 
operational days were attained.  This type of contracting often allows for the very best in 
innovation and efficiency as firms are able to fulfill the operational need rather than a 
material need.  
With this requirement in mind, the DMO began a two-stage Request For Tender 
(RFT) process.  The first stage of the RFT, open from September to November 2001, 
asked bidders to use one of two options for the replacement patrol boats (ANAO 28): 
1. PFI 
2. Direct purchase option with through life support provided under the same 
contract, for the life of the program. 
Six responses were received during Stage 1 of the RFT.  It should also be noted that the 
request for both a PFI and procurement with life support significantly increased bidding 
costs upon contractors. 
3. Comparing Finance Options 
To better compare the advantages of the PFI option, the DMO added $65 million 
over the direct purchase tender prices (ANAO 29).  This is referred to as the Public 
Sector Comparator (PSC) and attempts to take into account the risk accepted by the 
government in the direct purchase option. For example, in the case of the ACPB’s, 112 
risks were identified with the direct purchase presenting a greater risk in 39 areas, the PFI 
option presenting greater risk in only five areas, and 61 areas were granted equal risk 
from both options, and seven areas of risk which were not applicable to the project 
(ANAO 30).  Taking the transfer of risk into account allows the government to better 
determine the best value for money solution. 
 Comparing the direct purchase option (PSC adjusted) with through life support 
and the PFI option found that three of the four PFI options were more cost effective than 
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the direct purchase option (ANAO 30).  With this in mind, the DMO attempted to move 
forward with both the PFI and traditional procurement approaches while the legality of 
the PFI option was more thoroughly investigated.   
4. Operating or Financing Lease 
 Further investigation of the PFI option caused the ANAO to focus attention on the 
classification of the lease agreement.  As a result of this inquiry the Department of 
Defence sought advice from the private sector.  A private sector accounting firm provided 
the following analysis: 
the adopted leasing structure will result in Government bearing 
substantially all of the risks and rewards of ownership of the [patrol boats] 
and as a consequence the lease should be classified as a finance lease 
under AAS 17/AASD 1008.  The primary basis for this conclusion is that 
Government bears substantial risks and rewards of the [patrol boats] given 
they have use of the ships for the first 15 years and retains substantially all 
the residual benefits of the [patrol boats] at the end of the lease period 
(ANAO 29). 
 
The classification of the proposed PFI option as a finance lease rather than an 
operational lease forced the DMO account to count the entire project’s cost in one fiscal 
year, rather than payments over several years.  Although the Net Present Value of the 
payment streams associated with the PFI option provided an eight percent advantage over 
the traditional procurement option, having to account for all project expenditures as a 
financing lease proved to be too much to overcome.  In June 2002, the Department of 
Defence decided on the traditional procurement with contracted life support of the 
ACPB’s.     
5. Outcome 
 On December 17, 2003, DMS signed a $553 million contract with the Department 
of Defence for the building and 15 year servicing of 12 ACPB’s (DMO website).  The 
contract called for approximately $330 million for the acquisition and $225 million for 
the 15 year service agreement.  Although the PFI option was not accepted, the Australian 
Government still felt most comfortable with some form of partnership with the private 
sector and effectively entered into a form of a Government Owned-Corporate Operated 
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Contract (GOCO).  In an effort to provide government oversight on the service aspect of 
the contract, an abatement point system was established. 
6. The Abatement Point System 
The abatement point system is an adverse point system designed to punish 
contractors for not meeting contract requirements.  Abatement points provide incentives 
for the contractor to meet desired performance targets and removes some the risk of not 
meeting operational obligations from the Australian government.  This system serves as a 
contract enforcement mechanism in order to ensure the private sector meets the standards 
set forth in the contract. 
Throughout the life of the service agreements abatement points will be awarded if 
the contractor fails to meet operational requirements.  In the initial bidding in 2002, the 
government of Australia desired that abatement points be assigned if any of the following 
were encountered (Chisholm email): 
1. The patrol boat is not available for a period of baseline activity due to an act or 
omission of the Contractor. If the patrol boat continues to be not available beyond 
the specified Cure Period the Contractor incurs further Abatement Points. 
2. The Contractor fails to meet a Commonwealth ‘Request for Surge Availability’. 
Further abatement points are incurred for each additional Cure Period that the 
Contractor’s failure continues. 
3. Commonwealth issues a ‘Request for Support’ in respect of a defect. The number 
of abatement points incurred varies according to the priority of the request. If the 
Contractor fails to rectify the defect within the specified Cure Period further 
abatement points are incurred. 
These criteria are accompanied by specified cure periods and operational requirements.  
The number of abatement points awarded differs with the severity of the failure to 
meet operational requirements.  If the contractor accumulates too many abatement points 
in a given quarter they could face deductions in their service support payments.  With 
fixed annual payments to DMS of approximately $15 million, DMS is rewarded for its 
efficiency in maintaining patrol boat availability and for servicing the patrol boats 
efficiently by controlling their costs. 
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 Not only does the abatement point system provide DMS with incentives to meet 
all service obligations, but by combining the acquisition and service contracts it is in the 
best interest of DMS to build a high quality product.  The more capable and reliable the 
patrol boat is built, the less service costs will be incurred in the future.    
7. Current Status 
 As of spring 2006, DMS has delivered three patrol boats and all deadlines have 
been met (Chisholm teleconference).  Although the Australian government rejected the 
PFI proposal due to financial accounting rules, the government still recognized the value 
of public-private partnerships and the benefits from the transfer of risk.  With this in 
mind, the Australian government signed a contract for two additional patrol boats (for a 
total of 14) in September 2004.   
The satisfaction of the Department of Defence was further expressed by Defence 
Minister Robert Hill upon the launching of HMAS Armidale in January 2005, “I 
congratulate DMS, the principal contractor, and Austal Ships, responsible for the design 
and construction of the vessels for their work on this project…The delivery of the first of 
this patrol boat class on schedule has reaffirmed the Government’s commitment that the 
contracted delivery schedule for the remainder of Armidale Patrol Boats will be met 
(Hill).”  
8. The Future of Public and Private Partnerships in Australia   
The acceptance of PFI for procurement of military goods still must overcome 
some obstacles in Australia.  An accurate Private Sector Comparator remains an elusive 
task as does the general acceptance of PFI.  The Armidale Patrol Boat project is a step in 
the right direction and may have opened the door for future PFIs.  It is debatable whether 
a traditional procurement process provides better value for money, but if executed 
correctly it is proven that varying forms of Public-Private Partnership will deliver the 
government a quality product. 
 
G. CASE STUDY SUMMARY 
 The three case studies showcased in this report span the conceptual gamut of 
Public-Private Partnerships.  The Armidale Patrol Boat case is the quintessential build-
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operate-transfer or GOCO case.  Contrarily, the MSHATF and JSCSC are textbook 
examples of the build-own-operate or COCO model.  Each model has its place in the 
public arena, and can provide value for money when implemented under the appropriate 
conditions. 
The Australian patrol boat case, GOCO, sits in the middle of the risk 
responsibility spectrum, in that the government retains the financial responsibility for up 
front funding.  The risk and responsibility for the project are transferred to the contractor 
in the form of a long-term maintenance and service package.  Even though PFI was not 
the holistic financing model chosen, a public private agreement was generated for future 
service and maintenance of the asset.  In this particular case the Australian government 
decided to shoulder the construction risk early in the project and transfer later life cycle 
cost to the private sector.  By doing so, the government places the impetus on the private 
sector to reduce long-term life cycle cost.   
The GOCO model used by the Australian government is intended for long-term 
service oriented contracts, and is appropriately suited for most government activities.  
However, the focus of this research is on acquiring end items or warfighter assets.  The 
GOCO model does not adequately address the higher risk activities occurring early in an 
acquisition project.  Government entities routinely have major problems with these early 
risks.   
    The Joint Services Staff College and Medium Support Helicopter Aviation 
Training Facility projects typify the ideal COCO PFI model.  Here the contractor is 
forced to bear the entire risk burden throughout the life of the project.  The contractor 
does not generate revenue until the project is effectively running within specified 
parameters.  By placing all of the financial risk on the shoulders of the contractor there is 
a strong incentive to consistently meet milestones and complete them at or below cost. 
The government has demonstrated over time an inability to effectively mitigate 
risk, resulting in continuous project cost overruns blindly paid by the government.  The 
JSCSC and MSHATF projects provide true value for money by shifting the risk burden to 
the contactor during early tenuous evolutions such as construction.  The private sector has 
been able to develop techniques to deal with risk so that the companies that are still in 
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operation are truly efficient risk managers.  Finally, the JSCSC and MSHATF projects 
bundle a long-term service contract with the financing and construction efforts providing 
a more holistic project approach  
 There is no single correct answer, such that one PPP is better than the other.  It is 
our conclusion that through proper risk transfer, PPP or PFI can provide true long-term 
value for money in today’s financially constrained acquisition environment.  By 
embracing these evolving financing techniques, DOD can allocate more resources to high 
technology programs with the savings borne from other programs through risk transfer. 
The key is to shift the risk burden to the entity that is in the best position and is 
incentivized to mitigate its effects.  In this case, combining private sector expertise and 





















VI. COULD PFI WORK IN THE US? 
 In this chapter we will discuss the experience of the United Kingdom and the 
private sector view of Public Private Partnerships.   
 
A.   UNITED KINGDOM PPP EXPERIENCE 
These expensive projects can be attractive to the public sector, because the UK 
has shown through experience that these projects deliver real products and services to the 
public often for less and faster than the long laborious US acquisition cycle.  Figure 10 
shows aggregate comparisons of studies by HM Treasury (HMT) and the NAO (National 
Accounting Office, which is UK’s equivalent to the US GAO) on the success of on time 
delivery of assets or services by the private sector to the public or government; as 
compared to traditional timing where the government assumes all the risk.  The 
conclusions drawn are that about 80 percent of the projects were delivered on time or 
early as compared to only 30 percent through the traditional cycle.  Since 70 percent of 
the latter were late, they probably had significant cost overruns also.   
 




Figure 11 shows the PFI construction projects across different sectors and the 
proportions of delivery performance for each sector.  The defense industry had 17 
projects, eight were on time, six were early, and only three were late.  In a construction 
type of project, which the military can apply to many areas, these results are very 
encouraging.   
 
Figure 11:  Construction Performance by sector 
 
  
Finally, Figure 12 shows the cost overruns of PFI vs. Traditional projects.  It 
shows that of the projects that had overruns, those overruns amounted to only about 20 
percent of the contract value where non-PFI experience shows a 70 percent cost increase 
over the contract signature price.  The increase of 20 percent was due to subsequent 


















This shows that better allocation of risk improves results, and when the 
government changes its requirements, they do pay, but only about 20% more is paid.  
Previously, government paid four times more.  It should also be noted that PFI is 
attractive to private firms because it is long-term in nature.  As such, this approach should 
not be used in projects where technology changes rapidly, because these changes can 
drive up costs exponentially.  But for repeatable items, such as trucks, air refueling 
tankers, maritime transport tankers, training aircraft, and others, or assets that are not 
subject to constant technological change and customer interruption, these contracting 
structures should appeal to the United States government.   
 
B. OBSTACLES THE PRIVATE SECTOR MUST OVERCOME  
Like the government, private companies also view PPP’s with some 
apprehension.  Similar to a public agency’s desire to provide value to its constituents, a 
private firm desires to provide its constituents with substantial return on investment.  





1. Adequate Levels of Risk and Return 
The first potential stumbling block for private companies working with the United 
States government is the level of risk and return.  All corporations expect to gain a 
satisfactory rate of return from their investments, otherwise why invest?  As the level of 
risk increases, so does the potential level of return (DOT 93).   
In a study conducted by the GAO in 2001, it was determined that the promise of 
an internal rate of return of approximately 15 percent would draw considerable interest 
from the private sector (Unger 5).  Due to OMB-76 requirements for outsourcing bids to 
be significantly cheaper, it may be difficult for private companies to gain such substantial 
returns. 
As private companies may have to accept a reduced return, this must be met with 
a reduction in risk to gain interest from the private sector.  For instance, a longer lease 
agreement would be a way to limit the amount of risk.  In the same 2001 GAO study, 
interviews of private contractors found that they required a 50 year master ground lease 
in order to make the investment proposition attractive. 
2. Lease Length Limitations 
The United States government is reluctant to enter into long-term leases.  In an 
effort to limit the ability of federal agencies to enter such situations, Congress only 
allows for outlays up to five years.  Leases beyond five years require specific permission 
from Congress.  The inability to enter a lease for greater than five years significantly 
increases the private company’s risk. 
3. Turnover within Federal Leadership 
The United States military acquisition process moves slow and inefficiently.  The 
pace of acquisition not only detracts from PPP interest, but changes in leadership 
throughout the process may hinder or prevent a successful PPP (DOT 88).  PPP contracts 
are complex and require a significant amount of time to complete all details.  Economic 
conditions or assumptions also change.  Therefore, continuity in leadership is necessary 
for arranging a successful PPP.  Although there are career procurement specialists, 
personnel changes still occur frequently which may limit the trust built between the 
government and contractors.  Private companies will be more willing to enter into 
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agreement when there is long-term stability rather than a situation with ever-changing 
personnel. 
4. Stakeholder Opposition 
The United States Department of Transportation noted, “Effective public outreach 
is essential in garnering support for the use of alternative financing and must continue 
throughout the project planning, implementation, and operation (DOT 91).” Stakeholder 
opposition is also a significant obstacle for DoD’s use of PPPs. 
Defense contractors, members of Congress, and the Department of Defense 
officials, commonly referred to as the “Iron Triangle,” each pose a significant hurdle to 
any PPP.  In his last speech as president, General Dwight D. Eisenhower warned against 
the formation of such a relationship stating, "We must guard against the acquisition of 
unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex.  
The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist 
(Knickerbocker).”  Over 45 years have passed since this warning was made, but the 
influence of the defense industry on elected officials and the military is ever present. 
With an annual appropriation bill upwards of $400 billion, each leg of the triangle 
exercises a certain amount power within the system.  There are few incentives to change 
the system because all sides benefit from the outcomes.  The defense industry continues 
to profit, Congressmen maintain their jobs by bringing employment and government 
dollars to their constituency, and the Department of Defense continues to acquire new 
and advanced weapons systems to provide for national security.  Any change to the 
traditional procurement system has the potential to upset this balance of power and 
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VII. OBSTACLES IN INSTITUTING PPP’S FOR THE 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
 The United States government faces several obstacles in its acceptance of Public-
Private Partnerships (PPP’s).  Many of the obstacles the United States federal 
government faces in PPP’s are self-imposed, but the odds of overcoming such obstacles 
are extremely difficult. 
   
A. ANTI-DEFICIENCY ACT/OTHER ACQUISITION LAWS 
Since the leasing of the Maritime Pre-positioning Ships in the early 1980s, 
Congress has adjusted the laws and reporting requirements for potential lease agreements 
by the federal government in an attempt to make all life cycle obligations more 
transparent.  As a result, one of the main advantages of a lease (lessening the cost of an 
acquisition in the near term) is negated.  The current system states the following: 
When an agency is authorized to enter into a lease-purchase or capital 
lease contract, budget authority will be scored in the year in which the 
authority is first made available in the amount of the net present value of 
the Government’s total estimated legal obligations over the life of the 
contract… (OMB A-11)  
 
This policy is in response to the Anti-Deficiency Act, which prohibits the 
government from entering any agreement which they cannot honor.  The amount 
obligated in the first year must be sufficient to cover the intended life of the contract, or 
as in the case of leases, the annual costs and full termination costs.   
Prior to the passing of The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act 
of 1985, the Navy was able to avoid this extra required obligation.  An example is found 
in the passing of the Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1983. The Supplemental Act of 
1983, which was followed by additional contract authority, permitted the Navy to 
obligate only the current year cost of the lease and 10% of the termination costs (GAO).  
Unless a similar act is passed in response to a future lease proposal the military must 
obligate additional funds to meet the Anti-Deficiency Act requirements.  
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Many of these laws are the result of Congress’ reluctance to incrementally fund 
capital requirements for the military.  When asked a question regarding the current 
obligation rules associated with leases, the Assistant General Council (Financial 
Management & Comptroller) Ms. Anne Brennan, expressed that it is extremely difficult 
to gain incremental funding even for vital programs such as the Refueling Complex 
Overhaul (RCOH) program.  The RCOH program is the refueling required for the nuclear 
aircraft carriers and is critical to the United States Navy.  This apprehension is not 
surprising, but the unwillingness of Congress to relinquish any control over the federal 
budget is a definite obstacle that must be overcome for PPP’s to be successful in the 
United States. 
 
B. STANDARDIZED FORECASTING METHODS 
In addition to the up-front budget authority requirements, Congress’ desire to 
make all potential leases more transparent have further reduced the feasibility of leases.  
The elimination of increased tax revenues, addition of special tax benefits to the cost of 
the lease and establishing the discount rate have combined to create an unattractive 
environment for leases. 
1. Elimination of Increased Tax Revenue Consideration  
In its analysis for the MPS lease, the Navy subtracted the increased income tax 
revenue associated with the lease from the price paid to the government (GAO).  In the 
Net Present Value (NPV) analysis this was considered to be a cash inflow and not offset 
by the cash outflows.  This deduction was controversial at the time, and is no longer valid 
because, as the GAO argues, whether a company gains revenue through leasing an asset 
or selling an asset, the company will pay taxes on its revenue. 
2. Addition of Special Tax Benefits to the Cost of the Lease 
The guidance passed in 1984 requires that special tax benefits gained from leases 
by private investors be added to the cost of the lease (OMB).  This change significantly 
affects the offer price for leases because tax benefits gained from leases could be passed 




3. Predetermined Discount Rate  
In 1992, the OMB required government agencies to use the United States 
Treasury’s borrowing rate as the discount rate for the calculation of lease costs.  The 
United States Treasury enjoys some of the lowest borrowing rates in the world.  The 
lower discount rate makes it less attractive to postpone payments because the expected 
return on present dollars is dramatically reduced. Thus, one of the principle advantages of 
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VIII.     CONCLUSION 
 PFI can be a very attractive alternative to traditional public financing and 
procurement.  Throughout this project some common themes become evident as stated in 
an article by Andrew Kaye in November 2000.  In that article there are three high level 
criteria for attracting private sector participation in financing government acquisitions.   
1. Achieving good value for money as compared to other procurement options.   
2. Where workable service can be purchased with appropriate risk transfers and 
payment mechanisms 
3. Where there is a strong probability of negotiating a reasonable deal for both 
the public and private sectors in an acceptable time scale.   
According to Serco’s Executive Vice President, Strategic Development, Simon Chapman, 
“The key to PFI is the acceptable transfer of risk to both sides.  It is a mutual decision 
made by each side in the negotiation process” (Chapman).  The public sector can benefit 
greatly by taking advantage of the ability of the private sector to manage risk.   
 Achieving good value for money, or life cycle costs can be very difficult.  There 
are six primary drivers for value for money that are key to PFI contracts: (Kaye) 
1. Risk transfer 
2. Output base specification 
3. Long term nature of contracts 
4. Performance measurement and incentives 
5. Competition 
6. Private Sector management skills 
In the case of the Joint Services Command and Staff College project, the total lifecycle 
cost was evaluated to be 10 percent cheaper than the publicly funded option.  Serco seeks 
projects that can achieve at least a 10 percent savings.  In evaluating the project using the 
format above, the following results are seen.  
1. ₤26 million worth of risk was transferred to private contractors.  The risk 
matrix outlining the types of risk transferred is located in Appendix II, 
2. The specifications were explicit in the contract and were tied to payments, 
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3. The contract was for 30 years with the buildings reverting back to government 
ownership at the conclusion of the contract.  There would be no additional 
charge for 30 more years of useful life, 
4. No payments were made until the project was completed, and students were in 
the classrooms.  There is also an abatement system in place in the event of 
poor performance on the service delivery.  Thus, for extreme cases of poor 
performance payments may be withheld, 
5. The original Request for Bid had four bidders, and the Serco group won, 
6. Serco actively manages the costs of the service delivery now that the school is 
built.  If they can manage their costs while meeting the contract’s 
specifications, there is an added profit incentive. 
Additionally, private sector PFI solutions are usually more affordable than the public 
sector alternative in the early years of a project because PFI project payments are spread 
over the project life.(Kaye)  One advantage is that PFI’s annual payments help the MoD 
avoid budget spikes that occur in one-time upfront funding of conventional public sector 
capital investments .  A more profound advantage is that PFI can lead to better life-cycle 
costs (Kaye) 
 Economic arguments  
According to Professor Keith Hartley, Director of the Centre for Defence Economics, 
University of York: 
PFI/PPP’s are expected to lead to cost savings through specifying clear 
and enforceable contracts, transparency in the bidding process and proper 
cost efficiency incentives. Typically, the private sector becomes 
responsible for the initial design, construction, operation and maintenance 
of the project, [therefore] providing incentives for low-cost construction 
and minimum life-cycle costs.  As a result, project risks are transferred to 
the private sector (e.g. reducing cost over-runs and delays during 
construction) and private firms are encouraged to be innovative in project 
design, construction, operation and maintenance. 
One feature of PFI/PPP appears attractive, but needs addressing, namely, 
the desire by governments to transfer expenditures from the public budget 
to the private sector so as to avoid exceeding government financing limits 
(e.g. to meet Maastricht criteria). Simply transferring resources from the 
public to the private sector has no effect on resource allocation if identical 
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resources are used. Moreover, governments can always borrow more 
cheaply than the private sector. If PFI/PPP contracts are to lead to genuine 
cost savings, the extra financing costs for the private sector must be offset 
by savings elsewhere on the project (e.g. management and running costs 
over the life of the project) (Hartley). 
 
This reference seems to refute the attractiveness of PFI.   However, in the world of 
government procurement, where few projects are completed on time and significant cost 
overruns are common, the idea of allocating risk to the private sector and avoiding paying 
for the “entire” project seems to be attractive.  Additionally, most of these projects have 
been completed on time and within budget which is a vast improvement over our current 
practices.  We should use PFI if the asset is a support asset.  A simple adage from Serco 
is “if it does not move, definitely PFI it, if it moves, look into PFI it, and if it is cutting 
edge technology development, do not PFI it because there is too much uncertainty.” (The 
Private Finance Initiative 7)  The money saved year to year in not funding entire projects 
at the outset, thus eating up precious procurement dollars, can be used in our cutting edge 
programs.   
 Critics of this method of financing point to the notion that since the government 
can borrow at the lowest rates, it almost never makes sense to stretch out payments over 
long periods.  They further point out that these arrangements are actually a bad idea for 
the country because they add to the debt.  They say that we are buying goods and services 
with more debt, further widening our budget deficit.  PFI proponents counter in saying 
that because of the risk that is transferred from the public sector to the private sector, cost 
overruns and schedule slips become rarer and less severe because it is the private 
contractor capital that is on the line until the project is completed.  Thus, a preponderance 
of PFI projects are actually completed on time and within budget.  Further, cost estimates 
for many government programs are wildly inaccurate, and in most cases are “low balled” 
to gain Congressional approval to appropriate a little money to the project even though 
cost growth down the road is all but inevitable and cost overruns run rampant making 





On the basis of this research and a conversation with Simon Chapman, Executive 
Vice President, Strategic Development of Serco North America (Chapman) several 
recommendations follow: 
1. Form a committee to study the use of PFI methods on US projects consisting 
of PPP/PFI experts from industry, government budget experts, specialists in 
contract law, and lawyers.  This committee would study the examples of the 
British, Australians, and Canadians and investigate how these innovative 
financings concepts can be applied in the US  
2. Keep sustained Political Commitment.  After the Maritime Prepositioning 
Ship deal in the early 1980’s, most methods of private financing and leases 
have been very difficult to get through the budget.  The primary reason is 
because Congress felt they lost oversight of the MPS program and wanted to 
tie the hands of the military for future ventures.  PFI deals can meet with 
Congressional approval much the same way programs are approved now.  The 
above mentioned committee could turn into the US PFI Committee similar to 
committees in the UK and Australia. 
3. Recognize that PFI deals take longer to negotiate due to the risk transfer.  A 
PFI contract is actually upwards of 180 small contracts in one.  Therefore, 
they do take longer to negotiate, but recent guidance from HM Treasury has 
streamlined this process in the UK.  Due to the details and complexity of these 
contracts, subject matter experts should be added to the government 
committee and they should be empowered at the SES level with authority to 
execute these deals.   
4. Further study on the notion of debt and risk transfer.  Is it better for the 
government to enter into long-term (30 year) service contracts and obligate a 
financial restraint on the budget for the next 30 years than to outright purchase 
the capability and fund it in the first year of service?  Is the country really just 
using debt to finance its military support power? 
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There is no question that the UK has put faith in PFI projects.  They have even 
proposed that government makes sure to use private financing before using public funds.  
They have been able to attain capabilities that they would not have been able to attain 
without the PFI option.  We have mentioned three programs in the preceding case studies 
and they serve as good examples of “do vs. do without.”  They have also shown that new 
assets can be made without a bow wave of upfront financing and these assets are manned, 
and maintained via long term contract relationships.  In a world of ever tightening 
budgets, the US should at the very least look into this as an option to fund support 
equipment in order to free up budget dollars for cutting edge development and 
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APPENDIX B: RISK ALLOCATION ON JOINT SERVICES 








APPENDIX C: TIMELINE OF EVENTS IN THE PROCUREMENT 




Nov 1999 Phase 0 ACPB project, the scoping component, approved at $0.321 
million.  Total end costs of Phase 0 analysis was $3.43 million. 
Dec 1999 FCPB LOTE Halted 
First Pass Approval 
Jun 2001 Government provided approval for Defence to solicit industry in an effort 
to establish the costs associated with a replacement patrol boat capability. 
Sep 2001 Stage 1 of Request For Tender (RFT) issued for a replacement capability, 
to be offered as both Private Finance Initiative using a leasing finance 
construct; and as a Direct Purchase option, with follow on support option. 
May 2002 Tenix, Australian Defence Industries Ltf. (ADI) and Defence Maritime 
Services Pty. Ltd. (DMS) announced as successful tenderers following 9 
respondents to the Stage 1 RFT. 
Jun 2002 Stage 2 RFT authorized for issue, citing a requirement to proceed with a 
direct purchase option combined with an integrated follow on in service 
support contract. 
Nov 2002 Stage 2 tenders received. 
Feb 2003 Clarification Workshops were held with ADI, DMS, and Tenix. 
Jun 2003 Defence announced DMS and Tenix as preferred tenderers for further 
negotiations, setting aside the ADI offer, and the DMS steel hull bid. 
Jul 2003 Contract definition workshops were convened, with developed solutions 
being delivered to Defence in Late Jul 2003. 
Apr 2003 DMS announced as the preferred tenderer. 
Second Pass Approval 
Dec 2003 Defence signed a contract with DMS to deliver 12 ACPB’s, each with a 15 
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year support package.  Total contract worth, as signed, was $552.86 
million. 
Sep 2004 Government announced that 2 extra ACPBs would be purchased. 
Apr 2005 HMAS Armidale delivered (1 month ahead of schedule) 
Jun 2005 HMAS Armidale commissioned (on time) 
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